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Abstract—A layered approach to the evaluation of action 
alternatives with continuous time for decision making under the 
moral doctrine of Negative Utilitarianism is presented and briefly 
discussed from a philosophical perspective. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In theories of rational decision making such as Expected 
Utility Theory (EU) [1, 2, 3] and Subjective Expected Utility 
Theory [4], as well as in related fields such as Consumer 
Theory in classical economics, preferences among alternatives 
are commonly represented by a single-agent utility function 
that aggregates multiple attributes of each alternative into a real 
number between 0 and 1. In the simplest model of decision 
making under risk, EU recommends that alternative whose 
aggregate value times the probability of its occurrence is 
maximal. In a time-continuous setting one consequence of this 
approach is that any period of negative value („disvalue‟: pain, 
disutility, displeasure, etc.) may be outweighed by sufficiently 
high positive values or an extended period of low positive 
value. From the perspective of Negative Utilitarianism (NU) 
whose primary goal is to avoid disvalues this consequence is 
unacceptable; once a (dis-)value falls below a certain threshold, 
the doctrine of NU prescribes that the corresponding alternative 
must be avoided no matter what additional positive effects it 
might have. For example, according to NU a small amount of 
pleasure for a large group of people does not justify the 
otherwise avoidable death of one person. At the same time NU 
must allow for the ability to compare disvalues below a given 
threshold amongst each other, and so simple prescriptive  rules 
like „avoid deaths at any cost‟ do not suffice. If for instance all 
alternatives involve some quantifiable risk of death, a simple 
rule would recommend none of them whereas it is obvious that 
the alternative ought to be chosen that minimizes the death toll. 
We propose a layered approach to the evaluation of time-
continuous action alternatives that reconciles the negative 
utilitarian doctrine with the EU approach. In our approach, an 
alternative   may be outweighed by an alternative   (written 
   ) even if the overall sum of utility of   is larger than that 
of  . Formally, the account represents a mixture of EU and the 
well-known Maximin decision principle. We start by 
illustrating the use of a time-continuous value function in the 
non-layered case under certainty (Section II.A), then proceed to 
lay out the layered approach under certainty (Section II.B), 
address risk and uncertainty (Section III), and end with a brief 
philosophical discussion and a summary. 
II. UTILITY OVER TIME UNDER CERTAINTY 
A. Summing up values and disvalues 
Let there be a finite set   of alternatives         under 
consideration and suppose we can determine units of utility by 
functions        from points in time to utility for each 
alternative  . Although it is common to assume that utilities 
are positive, this assumption is usually just made for technical 
convenience and since we wish to talk about negative 
utilitarianism we need to be able to distinguish value from 
disvalue. Hence, we assume that the range of utility functions 
is ,    -. In this setting the total utility of an alternative   
under certainty within closed time interval [a, b] is given by 
the definite integral 
 
∫   ( )  
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Figure 1. Summing up utility over time. 
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 Figure 2. The Layered Approach. 
Figure 1 depicts this case. Disvalues and values are 
summed up, in the continuous case by the definite integral, and 
may therefore outweigh each other arbitrarily. (In economics it 
is common to use a decay function to discount value over time 
but this and other refinements are left out for simplicity.)  
B. A Layered Approach  
The layered approach may be characterized by the 
following rules: 
i. Tolerable small disvalues may be summed up with 
values. 
ii. There are one or more negative layers 𝑙0 > 𝜗1 ≥ 𝑙1 >
𝜗2 ≥ 𝑙2 > 𝜗3   ≥  𝑙𝑛 > 𝜗𝑛 ≥ 𝑙𝑛+1, where 𝜗1   𝜗𝑛 
are negative thresholds. 
iii. Only alternatives within the lowest layer are taken 
into account. 
iv. Within each  layer alternatives can be compared by 
summing up their utilities within that layer over time. 
 
 Notice that in our terminology the lowest layer  𝑙0 occurs 
highest in the graph; so the higher the layer, the less preferable 
it is. Figure 2 illustrates the approach:       within 
,   -, because (i)   and   are in 𝑙0 but   is in 𝑙1, and (ii) the 
sum according to (1) of   is higher than that of   in this 
interval. Formally, the decision procedure works as follows. 
Let   be the set of alternatives and  (     ) denote the layer 
of   in the interval ,   -, i.e. the layer in which the global 
minimum of   ( ) within the interval resides. We then 
compute the subset   (   )   *         (     ) + of 
alternatives in the lowest layer. These are the only alternatives 
to consider. Let   denote the upper threshold of the layer of 
the elements in this set if there is one, and otherwise     for 
layer 𝑙0. The elements of  
 (   ) are ordered as follows. If 
 >  , then 
 
    ⇔∫ (    ( ))  
 
 
 ∫ (    ( ))  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
and otherwise 
   ⇔∫   ( )  
 
 
≥ ∫   ( )  
 
 
 
 
as before. The set of recommended alternatives is the 
maximum *       + for any       (   ) and the ordering 
relation   determined as laid out above. The corresponding 
strong preference and indifference relations are defined from 
this ordering as usual. 
III. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY  
 Although we have also used it for value functions above, 
the term „utility‟ should perhaps be used only for decision 
making under risk [3: 35-6; 5]. In a setting with risk the 
expected utility is   ( )   ( ) ( ) for an alternative   with 
probability  ( ). In our simplified time-continuous model, not 
taking into account decay, multiple attributes and changes in 
probability estimates over time, this translates to a linear 
transformation   (   )   ( )  ( ), i.e. a contraction of the 
curve. In this case the same decision procedure as laid out in 
the previous section may be applied.  
In reality, however, risk can barely be determined exactly and 
epistemic uncertainty increases the farther an alternative 
extends into the future. One way to represent uncertainty of 
this kind is to associate with each alternative a pair of utility 
functions (  
+   
 ), each of which yields a maximally optimist 
and a maximally pessimist estimate. The functions will often 
be symmetric to each other around their mean and their 
difference is generally increasing with time, yielding a „cone 
of uncertainty‟ representation as depicted in Figure 3. How 
ought one deal with this type of uncertainty in the present 
framework? 
We believe that no general recommendation can be given 
for the layered approach, as this depends on the way the best 
and worst case scenarios have been estimated on one hand, and 
on the other hand from the perspective of NU also depends on 
what is at stake. Sometimes when the stakes are high it might 
make sense to remain cautious and use only the   estimates, 
thereby applying a version of the Precautionary Principle [6], 
whereas another time using the arithmetic mean ( +( )  
  ( ))   seems to be more adequate. We are not aware of any 
decisive criterion for deciding when to choose the former and 
when to choose the latter approach. 
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION 
A detailed discussion of the technical issues regarding our 
proposal would go beyond the scope of this article, and 
refinements such as multiple criteria and better representations 
of uncertainty are left for another occasion. It would also go 
beyond the scope of this article to address various known 
counter-arguments against NU such as the „Pinbrick 
Argument‟ or Smart‟s argument [7] in response to Popper [8]. 
Let us, however, note that these arguments address cruder 
versions of NU than the one presented here, which correspond 
to strict rules, whereas we are able to compare alternatives 
within the same layer as usual. Something must be said about 
our implicit use of the Maximin principle, though. It is well 
known that using Maximin as a decision principle leads to 
paradoxes [9], because it discards too much information. The 
principle only takes into account worst case scenarios. By the 
same token, the layered approach discards potentially useful 
information; it applies Maximin to the choice of layers. 
Moreover, we have suggested that a cautious decision maker 
might sometimes use the lower boundary   ( ) for decision 
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making under uncertainty. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect 
undesirable results for certain scenarios just like in applications 
of pure Maximin.  
Apparent counter-examples may even be structurally 
identical to those motivating NE in the first place. Take for 
instance a decision in safety or health care with an alternative A 
involving a minimal, yet quantifiable that some person‟s might 
lose their life. Assume any alternative with potential death of 
few persons resides in layer 1; by design, an alternative B in 
layer 0 would be recommended even in case the benefits of A 
might otherwise greatly outweigh the benefits of B. 
The problem is that sometimes we are willing to take such 
risks, for example when soldiers are supposed to die for „a 
greater good‟, whereas in other cases like reactor safety we 
would not be willing to take them, and two such scenarios 
might be structurally identical. If we accept this as a premise, 
then it seems on one hand that negative utilitarianism lacks a 
criterion. Fixing the actual thresholds in the layered approach 
must be considered an open problem of moral philosophy. On 
the other hand, this problem is also indicative of our proposal‟s 
main advantage: The approach forces decision makers to make 
moral thresholds explicit which might otherwise remain 
implicit in the utility functions used, thereby committing them 
to a particular moral viewpoint and making them accountable 
for it. While the constraints encoded by layers could in 
principle also be expressed directly by a suitably chosen utility 
over time function, our approach deliberately separates utility 
from moral valuation by implicitly rejecting the preference-
satisfaction view in the moral realm. If Broome is right by 
stating that “... the preference satisfaction theory is obviously 
false, and no one really believes it” [10: 4; cf. 11: 37-38], this 
ought not be a problem. 
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